

# Crisis Financiera Global: causas, efectos y políticas


*Alejandro Gay*

*19/05/2009*

# Bibliografía

- Blanchard Olivier (2009),  
“The Crisis: Basic Mechanisms, and Appropriate Policies”, *IMF Working Paper*, 80, abril.
- Taylor John B. (2008),  
“The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses: An Empirical Analysis of What Went Wrong”, *mimeo*, Stanford University, noviembre.

# Tasa de interés de los fondos del FED: Observada vs. Sugerida por Regla Taylor




Fuente: Mankiw (2009), Macroeconomics.

# Regla de Taylor


$$\begin{aligned} \text{Tasa de referencia} = & \text{inflación} + 2 \\ & + 0.5*(\text{inflación} - 3) \\ & - 0.5*(\text{brecha del PIB}) \end{aligned}$$

Figure 1: Housing and Stock Prices 1988-2008



# ¿Por qué un hecho menor (crisis hipotecaria) tuvo un efecto tan grande sobre el PIB mundial?

**Figure 1. Initial Subprime Losses and Declines in World GDP and World Stock Market Capitalization**



Fuente: Blanchard (2009)


# Hoja de ruta

- Condiciones iniciales
- Dos Mecanismos Amplificadores
- Interconexiones y Dinámica
- Políticas de corto plazo
- Política Fiscal en EEUU y resto del mundo
- Políticas de largo plazo
- Conclusión

# Condiciones iniciales


1. Se crearon, vendieron y compraron activos que aparentaban ser mucho menos riesgosos que en lo que en realidad eran.

# Política monetaria laxa



Fuente: Taylor (2008)

# Burbuja: creación y explosión




Fuente: Taylor (2008)

# Explicación alternativa

- Exceso de ahorro global

Las bajas tasas de interés en 2002-2004 fueron generadas por factores globales ajenos al control de las autoridades monetarias. Existió un exceso de ahorro mundial que presionó a la baja de tasas de interés en EEUU y otros países.

# Ahorro e Inversión mundiales



**Figure 3. Global Saving and Investment as a Share of World GDP**

Source: *World Economic Outlook*, IMF Sept 2005, Chapter 2, p. 92,

Fuente: Taylor (2008)

# Condiciones iniciales

2. La securitización condujo a una compleja y difícil evaluación de los activos de los balances de las instituciones financieras.




# Condiciones iniciales

3. La securitización y la globalización condujeron a un aumento de la interconexión entre instituciones financieras, tanto al interior como entre países.

# Interconexiones entre países

**Figure 3. Connectedness Across Countries: Advanced Economies Banks' Claims on the Rest of the World**



Fuente: Blanchard (2009) en base a Bank of International Settlements, Banking Statistics

# Condiciones iniciales

## 4. Aumento del apalancamiento



# Mecanismos amplificadores 1

## Corridas bancarias

- Bad (or doubtful) assets on balance sheets
- Runs (not only by depositors, but by other investors)
- Need to sell assets.
- Not enough deep pocket investors to buy.
- Firesale prices.  $P < ENPV$ .
- Worse balance sheets. More incentives to run, etc

# Mecanismos amplificadores 2

## Adecuación de Ratios de Capital

- Bad (or doubtful) assets on balance sheets
- Decrease in capital ratio (Assets minus liabilities, over Assets)
- Need to sell assets (deleverage)
- Not enough deep pocket investors to buy.
- Firesale prices.  $P < ENPV$ .
- Lower capital ratio. More incentives to sell assets, etc

# Mecanismos amplificadores

Los dos mecanismos son conceptualmente distintos, pero interactúan fuertemente.

- Corrida en institución financiera 1

- Corte de crédito a la institución 2

  - Venta de activos a precios deprimidos

  - Bajo capital, que provoca ventas adicionales

  - O corte de crédito a institución financiera 3


# Interconexiones y Dinámica

- Increase in probability of insolvency.
- Increase in counterparty risk.
- Decrease in volume and maturity of interbank lending.
- Contagion across institutions. From direct exposure to subprime onwards.
- Contagion across countries. From the US to Europe, to emerging market countries.
- Increasing effects on the ultimate borrowers: households and firms.

# Contagio entre activos, instituciones,

Figure 4. Contagion Across Assets, Institutions, and Countries


Heat Map: Developments in Systemic Asset Classes



Source: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, October 2008

Fuente: Blanchard (2009)

# Spread Libor – Overnight IS



Spread se origina en problemas de riesgo o liquidez


# Diagnosticar el problema

Problemas de liquidez

o


Riesgo de contraparte  
[riesgo default de bancos]

# Riesgo de contraparte explica el spread




Fuente: Taylor (2008)

# Facilidades de liquidez tienen poco efecto s/spread




Fuente: Taylor (2008) en base a Taylor y Williams John "A Black Swan in the Money Market," *American Economic Journal Macroeconomics*, January 2009.

# Inyección de efectivo aumenta ingreso pero no consumo



Fuente: Taylor (2008)

# Profundización de la crisis



Fuente: Taylor (2008)

# Estudio de caso de la profundización



Fuente: Taylor (2008)

# Taylor (2008): Conclusión

In this paper I have provided empirical evidence that government actions and interventions caused, prolonged, and worsened the financial crisis. They caused it by deviating from historical precedents and principles for setting interest rates, which had worked well for 20 years. They prolonged it by misdiagnosing the problems in the bank credit markets and thereby responding inappropriately by focusing on liquidity rather than risk. They made it worse by providing support for certain financial institutions and their creditors but not others in an ad hoc way without a clear and understandable framework.

# Políticas de corto plazo

Need to dampen/eliminate the two amplification mechanisms.

- Runs: Provide liquidity to a broader set of institutions.

Done. Still problem with institutions, countries without access to lender of last resort (Iceland).

- Capital.

- Buy bad assets. For two reasons: Clarify price. Move price closer to EPDV.

- Increase capital.


Many institutions may still need recapitalization. So need to add capital (buy shares).

- Second leg takes time to implement. May need guarantees for depositors, and for interbank claims. To start interbank lending.

Fuente: Blanchard (2009)

# Central Bank Policy Rates and Balance Sheets

**Policy Rates**  
(in percent)




**Central Banks Total Assets**  
(index, 1/5/2007=100)




Fuente: Blanchard (2009), "Where Are We In the Global Crisis?", FMI, 30 de abril.

# Política Fiscal en EEUU




# Política Fiscal en emergentes

Fiscal-stimulus measures of emerging-market G20 members as % of GDP  
2007-09, selected countries



# Growth Projections



Fuente: Blanchard (2009), "Where Are We In the Global Crisis?", FMI, 30 de abril.

# Políticas de largo plazo

- Back to the trigger and the two mechanisms:
  - To limit the build up of systemic risk.  
Broader regulation and monitoring systemic risk.  
Limit leverage.  
More transparent pricing and tracing of assets. Centralized trading rather than over the counter.
- For runs: Broader liquidity provision.  
Across institutions, in exchange for regulation,  
Across countries, for runs on claims in foreign currency.
- For capital: Procyclical capital ratios.  
A public fund to purchase illiquid assets at  $ENPV - x$ ?